Swings & Takes

Dan Wilsons again

The Mariners on Thursday illustrated why the best managers have long since abandoned the "closer," and also why managers don't matter that much.

My strongest opinion on managers is that they likely have minimal impact on games and seasons. Or more accurately, the margins on the decisions they're forced to make aren't large enough to override CHAOS. Scott Servais didn't manage the fun differential, the fun differential managed him. But my actual feelings must be more complicated, as Dan Wilson is now the topic I've spent the most time writing about this year. Wilson is new, and because he's new, and because I liked his predecessor a lot, and because I don't quite share the same feelings for Wilson (yet), everything he does feels controversial.

And nothing has felt so controversial as the bullpen management on Thursday.

Emerson Hancock gave the Mariners five strong innings, and Gabe Speier added a sixth. The Mariners were up 4-2 heading into the seventh when Wilson turned to Carlos Vargas. Vargas got an out and then loaded the bases. The leverage index moved from medium to quite high. Wilson stuck with him. Vargas allowed a run on a sac fly and then got out of the jam.

The Mariners got a run back in the top of the eighth to extend their lead to 5-3. Wilson brought in Eduardo Bazardo in the bottom of the inning. Bazardo got an out and then loaded the bases. The next batter would be the highest leverage moment of the game (5.87 on the leverage index). Bazardo gave up a grand slam. The Reds took the lead.

Now, from my perspective, in either spot is where you must use your best reliever when available. That's undoubtedly Andrés Muñoz. But Muñoz wasn't available because he's not a reliever, he's a closer. I don't like that strategy. And I will never like that strategy. One of Servais' credos I greatly admired was something along the lines of, "Win the game/situation in front of you now." I don't like the idea of holding onto your best weapon in a crucial spot in order to save him for an equally crucial spot that may never present itself. Win now, not later. I think this was about as obvious a "bad bullpen move" Wilson has given us so far, and it bit him in the ass.

But also, it didn't. The Mariners tied the game in the top of the ninth, held on in the bottom of the inning, scored four runs in the 10th, and won. It's almost the perfect illustration of why the modern manager is valued more for their ability to speak to the press than their tactical insight. The gap between good and bad managerial strategy tends to be closed by "baseball will baseball."

It didn't feel great to see Muñoz enter the game in the 10th in a non-save situation and in the lowest leverage reliever appearance of the game. And I strongly disagreed with the decisions that led up to that. However, had the Mariners not scored four runs in the 10th -- had they scored just one -- Muñoz would have entered not only in the most crucial moment of the game but perhaps the most crucial moment of the season so far. Wilson would have looked like a genius.

And that's how it goes. There's a trillion counterfactuals in bullpen management. Many of those scenarios do indeed favor holding onto your best reliever, even if more of them suggest to use them as soon as necessary. We also don't have most of the information that goes into who pitches when and why.

It's unfortunate that I'll probably only write about Wilson when he does something I don't care for, because I've found nearly all his moves to be on the continuum from defensible to "oh hey, that was pretty shrewd." I just hope he abandons the closer thing soon.

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